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Background: In recent years, hospitals in Iran – similar to those in other countries – have 
experienced growing use of computerized health information systems (CHISs), which play a 
significant role in the operations of hospitals. But, the major challenge of CHIS use is informa-
tion security. This study attempts to evaluate CHIS information security risk management at 
hospitals of Iran.
Materials and methods: This applied study is a descriptive and cross-sectional research 
that has been conducted in 2015. The data were collected from 551 hospitals of Iran. Based on 
literature review, experts’ opinion, and observations at five hospitals, our intensive questionnaire 
was designed to assess security risk management for CHISs at the concerned hospitals, which 
was then sent to all hospitals in Iran by the Ministry of Health.
Results: Sixty-nine percent of the studied hospitals pursue information security policies and 
procedures in conformity with Iran Hospitals Accreditation Standards. At some hospitals, risk 
identification, risk evaluation, and risk estimation, as well as risk treatment, are unstructured 
without any specified approach or methodology. There is no significant structured approach to 
risk management at the studied hospitals.
Conclusion: Information security risk management is not followed by Iran’s hospitals and their 
information security policies. This problem can cause a large number of challenges for their 
CHIS security in future. Therefore, Iran’s Ministry of Health should develop practical policies 
to improve information security risk management in the hospitals of Iran.
Keywords: information security, risk management, health information systems, hospital
Background
In recent years, rapid growth of information and communication technologies and 
increasing pressures for reducing health care costs, improving health care quality, ensur-
ing patient safety, and reducing medical mistakes have led to increasing use of comput-
erized health information systems (CHISs) in health care organizations.1–3 Currently, 
use of CHIS is a basic requirement for any health care organization such as hospitals.4 
CHIS refers to any computer system capturing, storing, managing, and transmitting 
personal or organizational health information in health care sectors.5 One of the major 
challenges of CHIS use is information security.6–8 Patients’ personal health informa-
tion contained in the CHIS is considered the most confidential personal information 
that should be protected.9 Electronic health information recording increases the risk of 
unauthorized access and disclosure of information. In case of unauthorized disclosure 
of information, patients, practitioners, and hospitals run into serious problems.10
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Computerized information systems of organizations are 
faced with a variety of internal and external threats, which 
can cause different types of damages.11 They can have adverse 
effects on organizational operations, information assets, 
individuals, organizations, and national areas of studies.12 
Therefore, information security is crucial for organizational 
survival, minimization of threats endangering organizational 
operations, and protection of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of information.13,14 The main objective of “infor-
mation security” is implementing appropriate control mea-
sures for eliminating or minimizing the impacts of different 
organizational security-related threats and organizational 
vulnerabilities.15 The main question is how information 
security can be effectively and economically implemented 
in organizations. The answer is Information Security Risk 
Management (ISRM).16
ISRM is a structured and continuous process with the 
purpose of identifying, evaluating, and minimizing some 
types of risks, as well as achieving appropriate acceptabil-
ity.17 ISRM is very important for organizational successful 
information security programs for the following reasons.18 
First, information security risks are not constant over time and 
vary depending on the conditions of the organizations, devel-
opment and changes in the information system, new users, 
and so on.19 ISRM is one of the ways to reduce the negative 
impact of risks on the organization.20 Second, through risk 
management, organizations can concentrate on resources of 
high-risk areas and can manage them by using appropriate 
and measurable ways while limiting risks reasonably.21 Third, 
one of the characteristics of a successful security program is 
cost–benefit analysis of the implementation of information 
security controls. This accurate analysis is performed by the 
risk management process.16,19
In Iran, a hospital is the main health care organiza-
tion.22 Thus, one of the major pieces of health information 
is recorded at hospitals. In the past decade, CHIS has been 
increasingly used by Iran’s hospitals. Accordingly, clini-
cal, financial, and administrative activities of hospitals are 
increasingly dependent on the performance of the CHIS, as 
compared with the past.23 Therefore, ensuring information 
security in these systems is of crucial importance for the 
hospitals. However, in recent years, CHIS security at Iran’s 
hospitals has faced greater challenges. In 2014, for the pur-
pose of reducing public costs of health care, a health reform 
plan was implemented as one of the major policies of the 
new government.24 Accordingly, hospitals are required to 
connect their hospital information system programs to the 
Iranian system of electronic health records (SEPAS system) 
through the Internet. Connection through public Internet 
network considerably increases the risks of unauthorized 
access to information; meanwhile, some findings reveal lack 
of specified rules on confidentiality of patient information in 
electronic health systems of hospitals.25 Moreover, in recent 
years, due to the disputes concerning Iran’s nuclear program 
and Iran’s disagreements with Western countries and some 
of the Middle East countries, Iran’s computer information 
system has been exposed to cyber threats, such as the Inter-
net viruses Stuxnet and Flame.26–28 These viruses, according 
to many information security experts in the world, are very 
complex and cannot easily be confronted.27,29 In 2014, the 
information security firms Kaspersky Lab and Symantec 
reported an advanced espionage malware (Regin), one of 
whose target countries was Iran.30,31
Considering the information security risks at Iran’s hos-
pitals and importance of ISRM in reducing and minimizing 
adverse effects of information security risks, as well as the 
effectiveness of the information security programs in hos-
pitals, this study investigates the ISRM status at hospitals 
of Iran. Findings of this study can provide a comprehensive 
view of the ISRM situation and its place in health information 
security policies of hospitals and can help researchers and 
policy makers interested in ISRM in health care.
Materials and methods
This applied research is a descriptive cross-sectional study 
conducted in 2015. All active hospitals in Iran (until August 
2014) were studied. In the first step, the research instrument 
for the assessment of ISRM situation in the hospitals of 
Iran was designed. To design the instrument, key processes 
of ISRM were identified by using the literature review in 
related information sources. The gathered data included 
guidelines, frameworks, standards, and methodologies for 
information security risk assessment and risk management, 
previous studies on ISRM in the hospitals, and other docu-
ments related to ISRM.
Several search engines and databases such as Google 
Scholar, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
Digital Library, Association for Computing Machinery Digital 
Library, and PubMed were searched to find the relevant docu-
ments. Documents were identified by the following keywords: 
“Information security risk management” and “Information 
security risk assessment”, combined with the terms “Standard”, 
“Method”, “Model”, “Framework”, “Guideline”, and “Best 
practice” or “Hospital”, and “Health” in English language. 
We confined our search to documents published from 2000 
to 2014. Inclusion criteria for selecting resources included the 
 
R
is
k 
M
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 H
ea
lth
ca
re
 P
ol
icy
 d
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 h
ttp
s:
//w
ww
.d
ov
ep
re
ss
.c
om
/ b
y 
19
4.
22
5.
18
7.
48
 o
n 
21
-O
ct
-2
01
9
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
                               1 / 1
Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 2016:9 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
Dovepress
77
Information security risk management
following: 1) availability of documents in English language and 
2) free access to full-text documents. Non-full-text articles and 
documents were excluded. Literature was reviewed to data satu-
ration level. When at least a risk assessment and management 
process principle appears in five retrieved sources, including 
articles, books, standards, guidelines, and methodologies, it 
was considered data saturation level. The data saturation level 
was determined based on three experts’ judgment (specialist 
in information security risk management). Sampling was not 
performed, and all the relevant literature, retrieved based on 
inclusion criteria, were evaluated.
A checklist was used to extract content from retrieved 
documents. In total, the specific guidelines, standards, and 
methodologies for information security risk assessment and 
risk management were as follows: International Standard 
Organization/International Electrotechnical Commission 
(ISO/IEC) 27005,32 National Institute of Standards and 
Technology Special Publication 800-30 (NIST SP 800-30),12 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evalu-
ation (OCTAVE) allegro,33 Method for Harmonized Analysis 
of Risk (MEHARI),34,35 Metodologia de Analisis y Gestion 
de Riesgos de los Sistemas de Informacion (MAGRIT),36 
information technology (IT)-Grundschutz,37 Information 
Technology Security Guidance- IT security risk manage-
ment: a lifecycle approach-33 (ITSG-33),38 Security Officers 
Management & Analysis Project (SOMAP),39 Threat Agent 
Risk Assessment (TARA),40 CORAS,41 Threat Vulnerability 
and Risk Analysis (TVRA),42 Factor Analysis of Information 
Risk (FAIR) Analysis (O-RA),43 and Expression des Besoins et 
Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité (EBIOS)44; and inter-
national standards of information security management (ISM), 
including ISO/IEC 1779945 and ISO 27799,46 were identified 
and surveyed. Moreover, eight studies related to information 
security risk assessment and risk management in hospital,47–54 
one report,55 and one book56 were retrieved and reviewed. In 
the second step, key processes of ISRM were extracted from 
the retrieved literatures. Figure 1 shows these stages.
In the third step, based on results of the previous stage, 
health information management and computer experts’ opin-
ions, and observations of the five selected hospitals, a com-
prehensive form was designed to assess the status of ISRM for 
computerized health information systems, including four dis-
tinct parts encompassing general information about hospitals, 
specifications of computerized health information systems, 
information security incidences, and self-assessment checklist 
of ISRM. Its content validity was confirmed by 12 experts 
of health information management, medical informatics, 
information technology (IT), and computer engineering (three 
professionals per area of study).These scholars were selected 
on the basis of their previous work experience in the hospital’s 
IT departments or their familiarity with the structure of the 
IT department in the hospitals of Iran. For data collection, 
this questionnaire and its guideline were sent to all 908 active 
hospitals in Iran by the Ministry of Health of Iran. To remove 
any possible ambiguity, an instruction sheet was attached to 
this questionnaire, explaining all sections. The hospitals were 
selected with regard to their CHIS application, such as hospi-
tal information system, Electronic Medical Record, Patient’s 
Admission and Discharge Systems, and so on. Hospitals that 
did not use CHIS at the time of this research were excluded. 
To facilitate and expedite the collection of data, this form was 
placed electronically in the official Web site (portal) of the 
Ministry of Health of Iran and hospitals were asked to register 
the relevant information in the aforementioned Web site.
After data collection, primary analysis was conducted in 
order to fix the defects and correct the information. Then, 
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Figure 1 Key process of information security risk management.
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Table 1 Distribution of hospitals in Iran that participated in the study
Type of ownership Active hospitals in Iran Hospitals participating in the study Participation 
percentageTeaching 
hospital
Nonteaching 
hospital
Total Teaching 
hospital
Nonteaching 
hospital
Total
Universities of Medical 
Sciences
241 324 565 184 220 404 72.2
Private 2 140 142 1 66 67 46.5
Military 6 45 51 2 6 8 15.7
Charity 1 29 30 0 12 12 40.0
Others 20 100 120 9 49 58 48.3
Total 270 638 908 196 353 549 60.5
Table 2 Policies and procedures for information security in hospitals
Type of  
ownership
Policies and procedures for 
information security
Framework for information 
security management
Framework for information 
security RA/RM
Number of 
hospitals 
Based on 
Iranian Hospital 
Accreditation 
Standard
Policy and 
procedures 
based on 
information 
security 
standards
Defining 
framework for 
ISM
Using a 
systematic 
approach 
to defining 
framework for 
ISM
Defining 
framework for 
information 
security RA/RM
Using a 
systematic 
approach 
to defining 
framework for 
information 
security RA/RM
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
Universities of 
Medical Sciences
245 3 4 2 3 0 404
Missing: 2 Missing: 1
Private 65 2 3 0 3 0 67
Military 4 1 1 0 1 0 8
Missing: 1 Missing: 1 Missing: 1 Missing: 1
Charity 11 0 0 0 0 0 12
Other organizations 54 2 2 1 1 0 58
Total 379 8 10 3 8 0 549
Missing: 1 Missing: 3 Missing: 1 Missing: 2
Abbreviations: ISM, information security management; RA/RM, risk assessment/risk management.
hospitals were asked through a second formal letter to take 
action to correct the defect. The collected data were analyzed 
by using descriptive statistics (frequency) in Excel 2003 
software.
Ethical issues
The study was approved by the Deputy of Research and 
Technology of the Iran University of Medical Sciences, 
Tehran, Iran. 
Results
Information related to the studied 
hospitals
Out of 908 active hospitals in Iran, 551 hospitals (60.7%) 
 participated in the study. Two hospitals were setting up CHIS 
at the time of this research. Therefore, they were excluded from 
the study and 549 hospitals (60.5%) were studied. The highest 
percentage of participation in the study was related to the hos-
pitals affiliated to the Medical Sciences Universities (Table 1).
IT personnel in the studied hospitals
Most of the hospitals (540 instances, 98.5%) had IT person-
nel. Conversely, they had Chief Information Security Offi-
cers (CISOs). On average, one IT personnel existed per 77 
computer systems and also per 84 bed counts in the hospital.
Information security policies and 
procedures in hospitals
There were some policies and procedures for information 
security in 379 hospitals (69%). Only in eight hospitals 
(1.4%), these policies and procedures were provided based 
on specific information security standards such as ISO/IEC 
27001. Additionally, all of these hospitals had a framework 
for ISM. Other hospitals pursued Iranian Hospitals Accredi-
tation Standards. Only eight hospitals had a framework 
for ISRM, of which seven hospitals implemented security 
policies and procedures of specific information security 
standards. None of the hospitals had a systematic approach 
for ISRM (Table 2).
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Process of information security risk 
identification at hospitals
Among the main activities of information security risk 
identification, only identification of assets, identification 
of threats, and control analysis were performed system-
atically in a few hospitals; these hospitals took ISM into 
consideration. At some hospitals, there was no sequence 
among the subactivities related to information security risk 
identification, ie, the activities were performed unrelated 
to their previous and subsequent activities. Altogether, 
the obtained findings indicated the lack of a systematic 
approach for risk identification. Among the subactivities 
related to information security risk identification, the high-
est frequency was related to information assets identification 
(415 instances; Table 3).
Process of information security risk 
analysis and evaluation at hospitals
None of the subactivities related to the process of information 
security risk analysis and evaluation was performed system-
atically at the selected hospitals. Although risk evaluation 
was not carried out in hospitals, 124 hospitals attempted to 
prioritize the information security risks (Table 4).
Processes of information security 
risk treatment and risk acceptance at 
hospitals
No comprehensive plan was conducted for reducing infor-
mation security risks. The main approach of hospitals to 
risk treatment was risk reduction, along with implementa-
tion of basic information security safeguards. None of the 
subactivities related to the processes of information security 
risk treatment and acceptance in hospitals was performed 
systematically (Table 5).
Residual risk acceptance and mitigation occurred only in 
six hospitals, which established ISM policies and procedures 
based on specific information security standards.
Communicating and sharing risk 
management results at hospitals
Communicating and sharing of risk management results were 
not observed in any of the hospitals.
ISRM monitoring and reviewing at 
hospitals
Information security policies and procedures, as well as 
implementation of control measures, were continuously 
monitored and reviewed at 146 hospitals and 142 hospitals, 
respectively, though it was not done systematically (Table 6).
Discussion
The results show lack of a systematic and comprehensive 
approach to ISRM at the studied hospitals. Although some 
activities are conducted for risk identification, risk evaluation, 
and risk treatment, they are not systematically structured, 
ie, the hospitals do not use the specialized methodologies 
or standards for ISRM. Therefore, there is no coherence 
between the activities related to ISRM at most hospitals. 
ISRM is a systematic, structured, and continuous process, 
through which various interdependent steps are taken, and 
the activities of each step are affected by the results of the 
previous stage.55 Without following a systematic and struc-
tured method, accurate risk assessment and management is 
not possible. Hence, various standards, methodologies, and 
tools are developed all over the world by public and private 
organizations, agencies, and different companies for informa-
tion security risk assessment and management.55–57
Only a small number of hospitals pursue ISRM frame-
work; yet, they are not systematically structured. Defining 
a framework for risk management is one of the initial steps 
of implementation of the ISRM process.55 The framework 
development specifies scopes of risk management activity, 
required resources, key stakeholders, and limitations and 
boundaries of the risk management process and also makes 
a contribution to the ISRM process.32 Lack of risk manage-
ment framework at Iran’s hospitals indicates weakness of 
information security policies and procedures. Information 
security policies are developed in conformity with Iranian 
Hospitals Accreditation Standards. Accordingly, hospitals 
are obliged to formulate policies and procedures for key 
processes in each department.58 But these standards are very 
limited, vague, and incomplete, as compared with specific 
standards, rules, or guidelines for information security, and 
do not cover many of the important details and processes of 
information security.
Only in a small number of hospitals, this policy was 
formulated based on special standards of information 
security, such as ISO/IEC 27001. All these hospitals had a 
framework for ISRM. Information security standards such 
as the ISO 2700X series provide an appropriate framework 
for organizational ISM.59 Using standard methods for 
ISM and ISRM is of great importance. Although Iran is a 
member of the ISO and ISO 2700X standards have been 
accepted as the national standards of Iran, hospitals do not 
use these standards due to the lack of specific national laws 
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Table 3 Information security risk identification in hospitals
Type of 
ownership
Asset identification Threat identification Vulnerability identification Control analysis Likelihood determination Impact analysis Number of 
hospitals
Identification 
of assets
Evaluation and 
prioritization  
of assets
Using systematic 
approach to asset 
identification
Identification 
of threats: 
sources
Identification 
of threats: 
events
Using systematic 
approach 
to threat 
identification
Identification 
of vulnerability
Using 
systematic 
approach to 
vulnerability 
identification
Continuous 
analysis of control 
measures
Using systematic 
approach to control 
analysis
Likelihood 
determination
Using systematic 
approach to 
likelihood 
determination
Threat 
consequences 
determination
Using systematic 
approach to impact 
analysis
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
Universities 
of Medical 
Sciences
294 140 2 198 186 2 101 0 105 1 75 0 116 0 404
Missing: 2 Missing: 1 Missing: 1 Missing: 1
Private 55 26 2 38 25 2 21 0 21 0 19 0 23 0 67
Military 7 5 1 5 3 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 4 0 8
Charity 9 5 0 7 3 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 4 0 12
Other 
organizations
50 18 2 32 27 2 21 0 32 1 19 0 20 0 58
Total 415 194 7 280 244 6 149 0 164 2 117 0 167 0 549
Missing: 2 Missing: 1 Missing: 1
on health information security. One of the reasons for this 
problem is weakness of major policies and rules associated 
with the health information security of Iran. Some studies 
reveal that rules of health information in Iran have some 
defects.60 In many developed countries such as Australia61 
and the US,62 there are national regulations, standards, and 
guidelines for health information security, especially in the 
electronic environment. These rules provide health care 
organizations and other stakeholders with a comprehensive 
and consistent point of view regarding information security. 
In addition, these rules act as a comprehensive guideline 
for implementing information security programs in health 
care organizations.48 In addition, IT governance and the 
IT department structure of Iran’s hospitals affect upon this 
problem. The research carried out by Shahi63 at ten hospitals 
of Iran demonstrates no framework for IT governance and 
IT department structure at the studied hospitals. Addition-
ally, the findings reveal that there are problems with the IT 
department personnel, information security procedures, 
and IT policy making.63 IT governance has a great impact 
on the information security policies of the organization. 
The main advantage of existing information governance 
in an organization is creation of an organizational point 
of view toward information security.64 According to 
ISO 27799 standards, there should be an organizational 
point of view toward information security at hospitals. 
 Information security needs to be an organizational activ-
ity with the participation of all employees. Information 
governance should be unified with clinical governance.46 
In their risk analysis model for hospital, Sunyaev and 
Pflug65 also emphasize on the responsibility of the hospital 
management in the information security process.The main 
problem of the IT department structure at Iran’s hospitals 
is the IT personnel. In none of the hospitals is the title of 
CISO  practically specified in the organizational structure 
of the IT department. CISO has a key role in ISM in an 
organization.66 Risk management, vulnerability assessment, 
and management of information security are all CISO 
skills.67 Furthermore, ISRM is a complex and specialized 
process and therefore, for applying the major information 
security risk assessment and management methodologies, 
specialized knowledge of the executive team, including the 
IT personnel, is required.55 Tavakoli et al68 reveal that the 
hospitals selected by them were not familiar with specific 
information security standards.
The success of ISRM depends on identification of all 
risks and, most importantly, analysis and determination 
of each risk level. Depending on the risk model used, 
risks are identified by determining risk factors such as 
assets, threats, vulnerability, likelihood of occurrence, 
and consequences.52 This study shows that determining the 
likelihood of occurrence and analysis of impact are carried 
out in less than one-third of the hospitals. Moreover, risk 
analysis and evaluation are not actually carried out in the 
hospitals. Determining likelihood of occurrence and analy-
sis of impact have an important role in constructing the 
scenario for risk incidence and risk determination.37 Risk 
analysis and evaluation form the basis for risk  prioritization 
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Table 3 Information security risk identification in hospitals
Type of 
ownership
Asset identification Threat identification Vulnerability identification Control analysis Likelihood determination Impact analysis Number of 
hospitals
Identification 
of assets
Evaluation and 
prioritization  
of assets
Using systematic 
approach to asset 
identification
Identification 
of threats: 
sources
Identification 
of threats: 
events
Using systematic 
approach 
to threat 
identification
Identification 
of vulnerability
Using 
systematic 
approach to 
vulnerability 
identification
Continuous 
analysis of control 
measures
Using systematic 
approach to control 
analysis
Likelihood 
determination
Using systematic 
approach to 
likelihood 
determination
Threat 
consequences 
determination
Using systematic 
approach to impact 
analysis
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
Universities 
of Medical 
Sciences
294 140 2 198 186 2 101 0 105 1 75 0 116 0 404
Missing: 2 Missing: 1 Missing: 1 Missing: 1
Private 55 26 2 38 25 2 21 0 21 0 19 0 23 0 67
Military 7 5 1 5 3 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 4 0 8
Charity 9 5 0 7 3 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 4 0 12
Other 
organizations
50 18 2 32 27 2 21 0 32 1 19 0 20 0 58
Total 415 194 7 280 244 6 149 0 164 2 117 0 167 0 549
Missing: 2 Missing: 1 Missing: 1
as well as decision making about risk treatment.69 In 
addition, determining likelihood of occurrence, impact 
analysis, and risk analysis and  evaluation require the use 
of precise quantitative or qualitative methods because it is 
more complicated, as compared with other stages of risk 
management. Accordingly, a variety of tools, examples, 
and methods are usually provided in risk assessment 
and management standards and methodologies for their 
accurate measurement.55 One reason for this weakness at 
the studied hospitals could be lack of specific methodolo-
gies and standards for risk assessment and management. 
Some other studies also indicate a weakness in ISRM in 
hospitals.54,70
The main approach of hospitals for risk reduction is 
implementation of basic control measures of information 
security, which includes a set of management, technical, and 
physical conservation for information security protection. 
Some of the studies also indicate the implementation of basic 
control measures of information security.68
Conclusion
There is a great distance between activities carried out in Iran 
for ISRM and the common and standard activities of ISRM 
in practice. There is no appropriate and standard approach to 
ISRM at Iran’s hospitals. This study suggests using specific 
information security standards such as ISO 2700x series as 
an effective method in the case of ISRM implementation. 
Considering the lack of specific national laws for health 
information protection in Iran, ISRM should be addressed 
comprehensively in a review of Iranian Hospitals Accredita-
tion Standards. For a better performance of these cases, they 
should comply as much as possible with the standards of ISO 
2700x series such as ISO 27799.
To help in risk calculation, based on the methodologies 
and specialized tools of information security risk assess-
ment and risk management, a computer program should 
be designed by the Ministry of Health of Iran to calculate 
the risk and this should be made available to the hospitals. 
Moreover, hospitals should be asked to plan their ISM based 
on professional standards of information security such as 
ISO 2700x series.
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Table 4 Information security risk analysis and evaluation in hospitals
Type of ownership Risk analysis Risk evaluation Number of 
hospitals Assessment of incidence 
scenarios
Using systematic approach to 
assessment of incidence scenarios
Impact estimation Using systematic approach 
to impact estimation
Determination of 
the level of risk
Using systematic approach 
to determination of the 
level of risk
Risk evaluation Using systematic 
approach to risk 
evaluation
Prioritization of risks Using systematic 
approach to 
prioritization of risks
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
Universities of Medical Sciences 0 0 4 0 3 0 3 0 81 0 404
Private 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 18 0 67
Military 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 8
Charity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 12
Other organizations 0 0 2 0 4 0 4 0 18 0 58
Total 0 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 124 0 549
Table 5 Information security risk treatment and risk acceptance in hospitals
Type of ownership Define criteria for risk treatment and risk acceptance Risk treatment Residual risk Identification and  
acceptance
Number of 
hospitals
Define criteria for risk 
treatment option and 
action plan
Define criteria for residual risk 
acceptance
Risk reduction by using 
comprehensive risk 
treatment action plan 
Risk reduction by 
implementation of basic 
security control measures
Using systematic approach 
to risk treatment
Identification of residual 
risks
Residual risk acceptance and 
remedy
Using systematic approach to residual 
risk Identification and acceptance
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
Universities of Medical Sciences 0 0  389 0 4 3 0 404
Missing: 2 Missing: 2
Private 0 0 0 65 0 2 0 0 67
Military 0 0 0 8 0 2 0 0 8
Charity 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 12
Other organizations 1 0 0 51 0 4 3 0 58
Total 1 0 0 520 0 13 6 0 549
Missing: 2 Missing: 2
Table 6 Continuous monitoring and reviewing of ISRM in hospitals
Type of 
ownership
Information 
security  
policy and 
procedure
ISRM policy 
and procedure
Risk factors Risk 
management 
process
Implementation 
of security  
control  
measures
Residual 
risks
Using 
systematic 
approach to 
ISRM monitor 
and review
Number 
of 
hospitals
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
Universities of 
Medical Sciences
91 2 0 2 89 2 0 404
Missing: 2
Private 18 1 0 1 17 0 0 67
Military 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 8
Charity 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 12
Other 
organizations
27 1 0 1 26 3 0 58
Total 146 4 0 3 142 5 0 549
Missing: 2
Abbreviation: ISRM, Information Security Risk Management.
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Table 4 Information security risk analysis and evaluation in hospitals
Type of ownership Risk analysis Risk evaluation Number of 
hospitals Assessment of incidence 
scenarios
Using systematic approach to 
assessment of incidence scenarios
Impact estimation Using systematic approach 
to impact estimation
Determination of 
the level of risk
Using systematic approach 
to determination of the 
level of risk
Risk evaluation Using systematic 
approach to risk 
evaluation
Prioritization of risks Using systematic 
approach to 
prioritization of risks
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
Universities of Medical Sciences 0 0 4 0 3 0 3 0 81 0 404
Private 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 18 0 67
Military 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 8
Charity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 12
Other organizations 0 0 2 0 4 0 4 0 18 0 58
Total 0 0 8 0 0 0 8 0 124 0 549
Table 5 Information security risk treatment and risk acceptance in hospitals
Type of ownership Define criteria for risk treatment and risk acceptance Risk treatment Residual risk Identification and  
acceptance
Number of 
hospitals
Define criteria for risk 
treatment option and 
action plan
Define criteria for residual risk 
acceptance
Risk reduction by using 
comprehensive risk 
treatment action plan 
Risk reduction by 
implementation of basic 
security control measures
Using systematic approach 
to risk treatment
Identification of residual 
risks
Residual risk acceptance and 
remedy
Using systematic approach to residual 
risk Identification and acceptance
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
Universities of Medical Sciences 0 0  389 0 4 3 0 404
Missing: 2 Missing: 2
Private 0 0 0 65 0 2 0 0 67
Military 0 0 0 8 0 2 0 0 8
Charity 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 12
Other organizations 1 0 0 51 0 4 3 0 58
Total 1 0 0 520 0 13 6 0 549
Missing: 2 Missing: 2
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